


# **Advancements and Future Directions in Secure Messaging with MLS and MIMI**

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RWC 2024, Toronto

Richard Barnes, Benjamin Beurdouche, Raphael Robert



# What is MILS?

**Transport  
Layer  
Security**

MESSAGING

~~Transport~~

Layer

Security

ASYNCHRONOUS

CONTINUOUS


GROUP


AUTHENTICATED

KEY

EXCHANGE


RFC 9420





# The MILS Standard

# Rough timeline



# Openness & standardization are great

Included academics & industry from the start

Push for stronger security properties + deployability

Positive feedback loop between formal analysis and protocol definition

Now we have many implementations, mostly open-source

C++, Java, Rust, Go, Kotlin, F\*, ...

All validated to interoperate

Open foundation for end-to-end encrypted applications



# Uniquely strong security for groups

**Efficient Full-Group FS / PCS:** When someone leaves the group (including replacing a possibly compromised instance), you need to use keys they don't know

Sender Keys:  $O(N^2)$  (in practice, nobody bothers)

MLS:  $O(\log N)$  to  $O(N)$  (depending on how the group is managed)

**State Agreement:** Everyone in the group agrees on whole state of the group, e.g., to prevent “ghost users” added by malicious insiders

**Credential-based Authentication:** Real applications want to authenticate identifiers, not cryptographic keys. Each MLS participant presents a credential.

# Group agreement is double-edged

On the one hand, a critical and highly useful security property

On the other hand, requires that groups have linear history

**Prime Directive of MLS Design: Each Commit has exactly one successor**

Classic State Machine Replication problem, with the usual solutions:

- Have a centralized server 🌟

- Run a consensus algorithm

- Update MLS to tolerate / heal forks

# A quick sketch of the Webex deployment

Centralized server routes MLS messages


Only one client commit, a “leader” nominated by the server

Clients track alignment between the Webex participant list and the MLS roster

Authentication that is only available with MLS:

- E2E Identity credentials

- Security code captures the whole state



# PQ support is included

Unlike many protocols, MLS is already based on KEM and has cipher agility

Just a ciphersuite change to add support for PQ

Weekend project to add XWing to Webex

2hr to add ML-KEM-768 implementation

2hr to add XWing ciphersuite to MLSpp

No changes to Webex except new cipher suite

Standard ciphersuite in progress (draft-mahy-mls-xwing)

Richard Barnes and Richard Barnes's meeting



Host: Richard Barnes

Copy meeting information

General



Security

**i** You are securely connected to this meeting with strong end-to-end encryption.

Meeting platform

Commercial (Webex Suite)

Security code ⓘ

[Learn more](#)

**J2X - 11Y - J62 - 28G - FF4**

Secure connection to Webex


Data: TLS\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384

Media: AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM

End-to-end security

MLS: XWING\_AES256GCM\_SHA512

SFrame: AES\_GCM\_256\_SHA512



# MILS and PQ

# Post-Quantum

## MLS has support for ciphersuites and cryptographic agility

- Standards are being built which means that we need to experiment to understand the tradeoffs between different schemes for variety of applications
- Strong security as a default

## MLS is ready for PQ

- MLS uses abstract KEMs and Signatures
  - eg. Replacing DH-KEM by IND-CCA2 PQ KEMS is trivial
- ML-KEM is not key committing unlike Kyber but HPKE fixes that
- Different kind of hybridization (hybrid crypto v. hybrid groups)

# Efficient PCS for Post-Quantum

$\log(N)^*$  KEMs are enough to provide PCS in **one** group operation

# Investigating PQ support for signatures


**Long lived groups means that PQ public signature keys do not have to be fetched very often**

- Providing hybrid security for signatures is a challenge [Hale et al.]
- An intuition is that the need for MLS is short signatures

**It is still early days for PQ signature schemes**

- MLS is ready to handle those new signature schemes






# MILS as a Platform

# Integration in Firefox

## Experimenting with Web Platform integration

- Ease of use for developers and users
  - Standardization / alignment of the API
  - Collaboration with implementers (mls-rs, OpenMLS, mlsp...)
  - Many thanks to Marta, Anh, Raphael... !!
- Performance
  - Native implementation (Rust, Formally verified C/C++...)
- Security
  - Constant-time cryptography
  - No secret manipulation in the page
  - Secure key storage
  - Storage isolation
  - Reduce trust assumptions related to the application

Coming soon to  
Firefox Nightly...



## Messaging Layer Security

The Messaging Layer Security protocol (RFC 9420) is a Continuous Group Key Agreement which can be used to establish large dynamic groups of clients and derive secrets or keys that can be used as part of many different kind of applications.

**MLS Platform Internal State:** Gecko will store state in dedicated databases in the profile directory of the user. The databases can be separated arbitrarily based on their name and will be encrypted with the associated key.

Database Name:  Database Key:

The key does not have the correct length.

### ▼ Generate Signature Keypair

The MLS system module will generate a Signature Keypair and store it in the internal state. The state contains the set of all public and secret signature keys that have been previously generated.

[Generate Signature Keypair](#)

### ▶ Generate Key Package

### ▶ Create Group

### ▶ Group Add

### ▶ Group Join

### ▶ Encrypt and Send

### ▶ Receive and Decrypt

**State Delete** The MLS database will be entirely deleted from the profile directory after proceeding with secure erasure of all secrets values.

[Delete Platform State](#)

# Integration in Firefox

## Open questions and next steps

- Defining an API has the side effect of constraining functionality
  - Ensure that the basic API covers “enough”
  - Ensure that it is safe and easy to use
- Discuss with applications and determine what are the possible use cases enabled by this
- Discuss standardization with other platforms

**Please reach out if you are interested in using this!**

# Building cross-platform support

## Secure 1:1/Group Messaging

- MIMI, IoT, Hypervisors, Enclaves, MPC...

## Video Conferencing


- WebRTC / SFrame, Media-over-QUIC...

## Encrypted Storage/Backup

## Password Managers

## Shared state synchronization


**... join us, it is all End-to-End secure!**



# MILS Extensions

# More metadata privacy

- Status quo: Built-in mechanisms
- Server assistance for scalability
- Other techniques



`MLSPriateMessage`

# More metadata privacy

- Status quo: Built-in mechanisms
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# More metadata privacy

- Status quo: Built-in mechanisms
- Server assistance for scalability
- Other techniques

# Ongoing work on MLS extensions

- Safe extensions
- Virtual clients
- AppAck: Detect dropped messages
- Last Resort KeyPackage
- Verifiable credentials & multi-credentials


# Deniability

- Status quo
- Trade-off between deniability and unknown key share attacks
- Attacks
- PQ situation
- Deniability in MLS?

# More Instant Messaging Interop (MIMI)

- Digital Markets Act (DMA)
- MIMI inception
- MIMI focus areas





**Finally**

# MLS is here, and getting better

MLS as an open, standardized group AKE with uniquely strong security

Group agreement, strong identity, built-in PQ support...

Platforms are invested in defining a useful tool for users and applications

Major companies already have deployed MLS and speed is picking up

MIMI is bringing MLS to the messaging ecosystem, and improving privacy

SFrame and MoQ are bringing MLS to the video conferencing ecosystem

**MLS is a tool to securely establish groups and secrets that can be used for your applications.**

# Thanks to the MLS Contributors!

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Brendan McMillion

Jon Millican

Marta Mularczyk

Emad Omara

Eric Rescorla

Raphaël Robert

Michael Rosenberg

Théophile Wallez

Thyla van der Merwe

... and many authors of cryptographic analyses